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The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement established the dollar as the world’s reserve currency and 
the United States as the most economically powerful nation on earth. Its termination in 1971 
gave the United States the “exorbitant privilege” of a fiat reserve currency. America’s export of 
fiat dollars supported decades of chronic current account deficits and debt-fueled 
overconsumption.  
 
Like the prototypical resource-rich nation, America suffers from a dollar-induced Dutch disease. 
An abundance of fiat dollars predisposed institutional failure: the economy increasingly 
advantaged few at the expense of many. Corporate activity reconfigured to transfer wealth from 
labor to capital, the proprietor of the dollar resource. Financialization undermined investment 









Introduction of the US dollar as a reserve currency: 
After World War II, the Bretton Woods agreement cemented the US dollar’s status as the 
world’s reserve currency. Since the dissolution of Bretton Woods, the US dollar has retained its 
reserve currency status despite declining economic and geopolitical importance. 
(Figure: Eichengreen 6, CNY not present) 
 
Today, the dollar is a fiat currency and thus has no intrinsic value. However, it maintains its role 
as the primary global reserve currency, with substantial benefits accruing to the United States 
government, economy, and capital markets as a result. However, much like any other national 
resource, this status has been abused, resulting in financialization, inequality, and industrial 
necrosis in the United States. Moreover, China is emerging as a new world power and trying to 
cement the Yuan as a reserve currency. The mutual progression of the US and China toward 
Thucydides’ trap highlights the increasing importance of this contest. 
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The US dollar’s replacement of the British Pound Sterling as the world’s reserve currency: 
The US dollar emerged from World War II as the world’s reserve currency, largely because of 
the disparate economic effects of both World Wars I and II on the US in comparison to Europe. 
Before World War I, the dollar “played no role in the international monetary system” 
(Richardson). However, the economic benefits of World War I accrued disproportionately to the 
US economy, increasing the economic importance of the US global trade and accelerating the 
US dollar towards reserve currency status.  
“When the war began the United States was in a recession. European purchases of goods 
for the war, mainly food and munitions, soon turned things around and created a long 
economic boom. This story was to be repeated after the outbreak of the Second World 
War, although the U.S. economy was considerably further from full employment in 1939 
than it was in 1914.  
 
...Nearly two thirds of the World War I expansion took place during the period of U.S. 
neutrality. It might make sense, therefore to look to a peacetime expansion for a basis of 
comparison. As we look backward in time, the first peacetime expansion to match or 
exceed the length of the World War I expansion was the gold-rush expansion from 1848 
to 1853.” (Rockoff 4) 
 
The US reaped the economic benefits of war with few of the detriments because it remained 
neutral for a substantial time. Even during its involvement, the US suffered virtually no 
destruction of productive capabilities. The US enjoyed immense economic growth, as measured 
by change in gross domestic product (GDP), a measure of national production that includes 
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personal consumption, domestic investment, government spending, and net exports. Each of 
these areas saw strength as the domestic economy’s production capacity and exports grew.  
(Figure: Rockoff 29) 
 
Like the gold rush, the US’ peacetime involvement led to a “gold-backed expansion of the stock 
of money” (Rockoff 4).  US exports of munitions to Europe drove an immense trade surplus. The 
United States settled balance of payments surpluses in gold, which drove monetary expansion via 
net transfers of gold from Europe to the United States. Like the gold rush, the result was 
“inflation, real income growth, and a long boom” from 1914 to 1917 (Rockoff 4).  The munitions 
manufacturing boom also “made the ultimate conversion of the economy to a wartime basis 
easier than it otherwise would have been,” reducing economic discontinuity usually associated 
with transitions of productive capacities in wartime (Rockoff 5).  
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Furthermore, the newly-founded Federal Reserve system mitigated the economic disruptions 
associated with retooling the economy and transitioning to war. The Federal Reserve “created a 
market for trade credits, smoothed seasonal interest rate spikes, reduced financial volatility, and 
solidified management of the gold standard” (Richardson).  
 
The economic tailwinds of World War I helped the United States’ improved its monetary status 
through global capital markets. With its newfound wealth, the United States a capital exporter, or 
an investor abroad. As the United States became a net creditor, it invested “large amounts 
abroad, especially in Latin America, taking on the role traditionally played by Britain and other 
European capital exporters” (Rockoff 21). Increasing activity in global financial markets 
supported dollar ubiquity, contributing to perception of the dollar as a global means of exchange. 
Furthermore, increased participation of American financial institutions in global capital markets 
spurred the development of its financial infrastructure, including market makers and investment 
banks. The shift of financial power to the United States made it economically competitive with 
European superpowers,  attracting talent and investment that drove productivity and technology 
growth throughout the 20th century (Rockoff 20).  
“New York could justly claim to have emerged from the War as London’s equal if not her 
superior in the contest to be the world’s leading financial center. Britain’s economic 
weakness, a direct result of the war, and the difficulties surrounding her return to the 
gold standard naturally meant that entrepreneurs and governments would look to the one 
industrial nation that had remained largely unscathed by the war.” (Rockoff 21) 
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(Figure: Rockoff 37) 
 
Recalling the Great Depression in the US and abroad: 
After the 1929 stock market crash, the United States and Britain faced the Great Depression, 
which brought balance of payment crises analogous to that precipitating the end of Bretton 
Woods in 1971. The Great Depression illustrates the challenges of a gold standard and the 
relation between credit cycles and currency status.   
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Unsustainable asset price inflation preceded the Great Depression. After World War I, the US 
experienced a technology-led boom with massive productivity gains and low inflation.  
(Figure: Dalio, Part 2, p.49) 
(Figure: Dalio, Part 2, p.53) 
 
Robust post-war growth within the US attracted investment from abroad. Gold “flowed from 
other countries to the US” as “investors bought dollars” (Dalio, Part 2 50). In 1927, “European 
currencies, and particularly sterling” began to show “weakness” (Miller 445). European 
countries had “considerable concern” for the gold standard, and the US “feared” that European 
currency weakness would “interfere with sales of agricultural products”(Miller 445).  
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(Figure: Miller 445) 
 
Federal Reserve banks doubled their holdings of US government securities from “$300,000,000 
in May to $600,000,000 in December” and reduced “discount rates at all reserve banks from “4 
to 3 ½ per cent during the third quarter of the year,” “cheapening the cost of credit to borrowing 






(Figure: Miller 443) 
 
The Federal Reserve’s interventions transformed optimism into leverage-fueled market hysteria. 
An explosion in debt, including margin debt used to purchase stocks, fueled the bubble. 
Investment trusts, leveraged passive investment vehicles, grew immensely (Dalio, Part 2 52). 
Markets roared as investors became increasingly complacent.  
(Figure: Dalio Part 2 52) 
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(Figure: Dalio Part 2 52) 
 
The Federal Reserved knowingly created precarious market conditions because its mandate 
targets unemployment and inflation, not debt growth.  
“The federal reserve saw its function as meeting the needs of business for liquidity--
consistent with the idea of providing an elastic currency--with the ultimate goal of 
supporting financial and economic stability  (Bernanke) 
 
Throughout the Federal Reserve’s easing cycle, prices remained stable. Thus, easing was within 
the Fed’s mandate.  
(Figure: Miller 444) 
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The Federal Reserve tried to mitigate a bubble by aggressively raising rates throughout 1928 and 
1929.  
(Figure: Miller 446) 
 
Rising short term rates flattened the yield curve as risk-averse investors pushed into duration 
securities. The flattening rate term structure made cash more attractive relative to financial 
assets. Money flowed out of financial assets, precipitating a market selloff exacerbated by 
margin calls on the very leverage that had pushed the market to its highs. The rout popped the 
1920s asset bubble and led to a negative wealth effect that rippled throughout the economy as 
consumers and businesses alike cut spending.  
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(Figure: Dalio, Part 2 54) 
(Figure: Miller 448) 
 
In the face of collapsing asset prices, the Federal Reserve’s purchases of government securities 
to provide liquidity to markets proved insufficient to stave off further declines (Dalio, Part 2 58). 
The Hoover administration lowered taxes, increased infrastructure spending, and “created a 
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leadership committee of 72 of the top business tycoons of the 1920s” (Dalio, Part 2 60). These 
fiscal and monetary efforts did not ease problems in the credit market, where spreads continued 
to widen. The Smoot-Hawley Tariffs exacerbated business conditions with immigration 
restrictions and other protectionist policies. Bank runs and subsequent failures in subsequent 
months exacerbated the crisis and led to further credit contraction. (Dalio, Part 2 64). 
 
The gold standard constrained policy responses to the crisis. The gold standard constrained the 
money supply, suppressing central bank lending to “bank[s] facing liquidity problems” (Dalio, 
Part 2 64). Money supply constraints also limit fiscal policy responses. The Federal Reserve’s 
inability to meaningfully monetize deficits meant that incremental Treasury issuance would push 
up yields. In the face of declining tax receipts, the Hoover administration pushed fiscal austerity 
policies. Limited monetary and fiscal support for the economy led to self-reinforcing credit 
contraction and a “global dollar shortage” because dollars had been lent broadly around the 
world (Dalio, Part 2 65). Debt deflation ensued as negative inflation and credit contraction 
reduce consumption in a self-reinforcing cycle. Meanwhile, rising risk premia made it difficult 
for dollar debtors, particularly Germany, to repay their debts. Germany suffered immense capital 
flight as investors withdrew capital, fearing a German debt default (Dalio, Part 2 69).  
 
Hoover instituted a one-year debt moratorium meant to mitigate this crisis by forcing banking 
institutions in the US, Britain, and other Allied nations to continue extending credit to Germany. 
However, the measures “came too late to prevent a general banking panic in Germany, and soon 
enormous sums of short-term credits were frozen” (Wilson 185). The panic spread to Britain, 
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whose banks had many outstanding loans to Germany. Eventually, the UK abandoned the gold 
standard to prevent capital flight (Dalio, Part 2 74).  
 
Credit crises and currency devaluations around the world drove the dollar higher as foreclosures 
and bank failures rose in the United States. Hoover created the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation to provide liquidity to solvent banks and signed the 1932 Banking Act to enable the 
Federal Reserve to “print money, but only to buy government bonds” (Dalio, Part 2 78).  
 
(Figure: Dalio, Part 2 89) 
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(Figure: Dalio, Part 2 89) 
 
Stimulation efforts under Hoover expanded the monetary base against constant gold reserves, 
prompting a run on the dollar that shrank the US money supply and tightened credit, 
counteracting the policies’ simulative intent.  
The solution to the crisis came in the American departure from the gold standard under FDR. 
With a fiat dollar, the Federal reserve could expanded the money supply without an economy-
jeopardizing run on the dollar. Massive asset repurchases under the new fiat regime mitigated 
credit contraction, which, along with low rates, helped incomes to grow faster than debts. The 
breakthrough was only possible through devaluation (Dalio, Part 2 90)  
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(Dalio, Part 2 86) 
 
The Great Depression exemplified the challenges of implementing a gold standard over time and 
across countries. It reduces the ability of monetary authorities to act in concert, increasing risks 
of economic crises, and reduces the flexibility of monetary authorities to deal with those crises.  
 
World War II: 
At the end of World War II, the Allied Powers met in Bretton Woods, US, to develop a new 
monetary order based on gold and the US dollar.  
“Fixed exchange rates were no longer defined in terms of gold parity but in terms of 
dollars. Only the US dollar was defined as convertible into gold at $35 per ounce” 
(Monnet 7) 
 
The convention chose the United States because it had substantial amounts of gold following 
World War II. The United States “kept more than 90 percent of gold reserves held in the world 
by monetary authorities after the war,” which it amassed through its prominent role as a creditor 




US gold reserves began to rapidly wane after the War. Interestingly, other central banks began to 
amass gold despite the fact that only the US was required by the Bretton-Woods resolution.  
(Figure: Monnet 9) 
 
Despite the elimination of gold requirements, countries relatively deficient in gold increased 
their gold reserves substantially through 1970. 
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(Figure: Monnet 10) 
 
The Downfall of Bretton Woods: 
The Bretton Woods system operated under an “adjustable peg system” to the dollar, which 
members could adjust in cases of “fundamental disequilibrium,” which was “never defined” but 
“presumed” as a “permanent supply shock” (Bordo 3). As Bretton woods evolved, it conferred 
special “reserve” status on the US because there was not enough gold being produced at current 
exchange rates to meet the growing world economy’s need for currency:  
“The gold-dollar system arose because growth in the global monetary gold stock was 
inadequate to finance the growth of world trade and output. This in turn resulted from the 
post-war choice of parities that put a low real price on gold, which restricted gold 
production. Moreover, the main sources of gold supply at the time, the USSR and South 
Africa, were unreliable (Gilbert (1966)); Mundell (1996)). The gap between global 
reserve demand and supply was filled by dollars produced by an accumulation of official 
short-term claims on the United States from the early 1950s. In contemporary terms, the 
United States was running US balance of payments deficits under official settlements, as 
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it accumulated liabilities to foreign officials without increasing official assets like gold.” 
(Bordo 3) 
 
In 1959, Robert Triffin testified in front of US Congress that Bretton Woods was fundamentally 
flawed. In the Bretton Woods years, the United States consistently ran considerable balance of 
payments deficits, which provided “a steady stream of dollars...to fuel world economic growth” 
(International Monetary Fund). To prevent the dollar from rising and crushing domestic 
manufacturers, the Federal Reserve expanded the money supply. As the arrangement wore on, 
claims on gold via US dollars grew to vastly outweigh gold in US central banks: the notional 
value of dollars in gold terms was far greater than US reserves. America’s massive gold 
liabilities to other nations threatened the reserve status of the dollar and thus the entire Bretton 
Woods system.  
 
The US could not solve the problem under the Bretton Woods system. Rectifying the balance of 
payments deficit would preserve the dollar’s fixed exchange to gold but deprive the world of 
liquidity, putting upward pressure on real interest rates via deflation and crushing global 
economic activity (International Monetary Fund).  
 
Triffin’s argument recalls Feliks Młynarski’s, given in 1929: the supply of gold was insufficient 
to meet the monetary needs of the US economy (Bordo 3). As in the Great Depression, the 
Federal Reserve could not maintain the gold standard while implementing policies to prevent 
large-scale debt deflation that would jeopardize the economy. The dollar’s reserve status only 
exacerbated this issue.  
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The experiences of the US in the great depression validated Triffin’s argument. A gold standard 
put deflationary pressure on the economy, threatened the banking system, and offered 
policymakers too few levers to deal with crises. The United States again faced a balance of 
payments crisis.  
(Figure: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) 
(Figure: Bordo 4) 
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Countries with US trade surpluses were exchanging their dollars for gold, depleting US gold 
reserves. The US had to de-peg or risk being unable to meet its foreign gold obligations 
(Reinbold and Wen).  
 
The Post-Bretton Woods Era and the evolution of Triffin’s dilemma: 
After Nixon suspended the dollar’s convertibility to gold, the US dollar retained its position as 
the world’s reserve currency. In theory, a fiat reserve currency system gave the US extreme 
monetary flexibility. Fiat dollars allowed the US to run large deficits denominated in its own 
currency, which it would pay off by printing money as necessary. Normally, money printing 
would negatively impact the currency’s value, but the dollar’s reserve status made it more 
resistant to devaluation. 
 
Triffin expected the US to tighten monetary policy in order to preserve the gold peg, leading to a 
global deflation, much like the Great Depression. Instead, the dissolution of the gold peg created 
great inflation.    
(Figure: FRED) 
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In response to the developments, Triffin said:  
“Let me also admit, however that I did change my mind about the main danger 
confronting the future of the international monetary system. While my initial diagnosis 
was seen by central bankers as placing excessive stress on the first horn of the Triffin 
Dilemma, the danger of world deflation, my later writings placed increasing stress on the 
second, the inflationary potential of continuing U.S. deficits...Even so, I was totally 
wrong in underestimating the duration and the size of the U.S. deficits that foreign 
central bankers would be willing to absorb, at the cost of an inflationary explosion of 
world monetary reserves and of a multiple expansion of the money supply in their 
countries under the traditional system of fractional reserve requirements.” (Bordo 5). 
 
Formulating Triffin’s argument in the context of the fiat reserve US dollar: the US will 
necessarily run a current account deficit as other countries accumulate dollar reserves. If other 
countries increase their reserves in proportion to their own GDP, which is growing faster than 
that of the US, US “external indebtedness” via dollar liabilities will “rise unsustainably” (Bordo 
13). The modern formulation of Triffin’s argument indicates that even a fiat reserve currency 
will suffer balance of payments constraints. America’s “exorbitant privilege” allowed it to 
borrow “short at low cost in order to acquire long term claims on the rest of the world” at the 
expense of chronic deficits (Bordo 13).  
 
The modern Triffin argues that the dollar reserve system necessitates chronic current account 
deficits: “US current accounts are clearly linked to those in the rest of the world thanks to the N-
1 problem” (Bordo 13). Emerging export economies run current account surpluses, creating 
deficits in reserve countries, namely the US.  
 
The modern Triffin argument “requires that the rest of the world runs current account surpluses 
for a particular reason, namely to acquire dollar reserves as international liquidity” (Bordo 14). 
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China serves as a counterexample. China “saw its foreign exchange reserves fall from $4 trillion 
to $3 trillion, but where M2 and credit growth continued to grow smartly at double-digit rates” 
(Bordo 14). However, China is an important exception because it has capital controls and highly 
centralized economic control. Another caveat: “borrowers resident outside the United States 
widely use the dollar to denominate debts that are in turn largely held by non-resident creditors 
(McCauley et al (2015a, b))” (Bordo 16). Regardless, non-reserve economies generally need to 
maintain foreign reserves to modulate the exchange rates of their currencies.  
 
Despite multiple explanations for the accumulation of US dollar reserves, the implication for the 
United States remains the same: US consumption creates a current account deficit that must be 
financed with a financial or capital account surplus. US consumption is supported largely by 
capital flows, which include “foreign purchases of debt securities, equity securities, and direct 
investment” that reflect the “desire of foreigners to participate in higher-return investment 
opportunities in the United States” (Economic Report to the President).  
 
US capital flows can be divided into public and private. Public capital flows include foreign 
central bank investments in US Treasury securities, which they hold as reserves. The US issues 
debt as interest-bearing Treasury securities. Most foreign central banks hold Treasuries rather 
than dollars to generate income. American and foreign investors also hold US treasuries for risk-
free income. Private capital flows include financial assets such as debt and equity. The US 
attracts substantial foreign capital because the dollar is the reserve currency, and because 
American capital markets are the largest (market capitalization, debt outstanding) and the most 
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liquid (turnover) in the world. Continued growth of US financial assets, both public and private,  
draws in foreign capital and supports current account deficits.  
 
(Figure: World Bank 134) 
 
The Exorbitant Privilege: 
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, French minister of finance from 1962 to 1966 and 1969 to 1974, 
coined the term “exorbitant privilege” to argue that the dollar’s reserve currency status  allows 
the US to consume beyond its means through massive trade deficits and low interest rates.  
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“This has long been a sore point for foreigners, who see themselves as supporting 
American living standards and subsidizing American multinationals through the 
operation of this asymmetric financial system” (Eichengreen 4) 
 
Primarily, “exorbitant privilege” claims that the dollar transfers wealth through seigniorage, the 
issuance of currency. The US produces costless dollars for which “countries have to pony 
up...actual goods and services” (Eichengreen 3). The asymmetry of dollar production allows 
“American households to live beyond their means” such that “poor households in the developing 
world [end] up subsidizing rich ones in the United States” (Eichengreen 5). This arrangement 
theoretically gives the US an advantage in monetary and fiscal policy: the Federal reserve can 
grow money supply with minimal impacts to exchange rate, and the US can run sustained high 
current account deficits because of demand for dollars. However, a strong currency 
disadvantages US exports and advantages foreign imports (Richardson). Dollar strength in the 
face of accommodative monetary policy drives de-industrialization and financialization.  
 
Mechanically, the external account is “determined partly by domestic policies and conditions, 
but also by foreign policies and conditions, which in the latter case directly affects the 
relationship between domestic American consumption and savings” (Pettis). Net exporters 
suppress their currencies by buy dollars to support a positive current account balance, 
“export[ing] their savings to the rest of the world” (Pettis). Foreign nations purchase “excess 
amounts of dollars” as a “policy...aimed at generating trade surpluses and higher domestic 
employment” (Pettis). Savings exportation supports the US dollar exchange rate despite 
substantial US trade deficits. However, these savings are immensely deflationary for the US. An 
“overvalued dollar” makes exports less competitive, forcing manufacturers to “reduce production 
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and fire American workers” (Pettis). Meanwhile, corporations assume increasingly large debt 
loads that limit their ability to invest in capital equipment that drives long term growth.  
 
The reserve currency nation must “choose between rising unemployment and debt” (Pettis). 
Because dollar strength hurts domestic industries, the Federal Reserve must respond per its 
inflation and employment mandate to “increase domestic demand—and with it domestic 
employment—by running up public or private debt” (Pettis). Debt abundance creates more 
dollar-denominated assets, driving dollar strength and perpetuating debt deflation. The result is 
the situation the US finds itself in today: “gaping trade deficit, low level of savings, and high 
levels of private and public debt” (Pettis). This cycle is an endogenous feedback loop, coined in 
financial contexts as “reflexivity” (Soros).  
 
The exorbitant privilege also argues that dollar demand suppress US interest rates. This would 
hold in a vacuum, but aforementioned US debt issuance puts upward pressure on rates. 
Moreover, under a view that “trade is a more efficient way to create jobs than government 
spending or consumer financing,” US debt issuance “will actually exceed net foreign purchases” 
which could cause US rates to rise (Pettis).   
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US treasuries have generally offered higher yields than other sovereign debt securities from 
developed countries. Current interest rate levels are sustainable because they are “lower than the 
growth rate of nominal GDP,” which holds regardless of reserve currency status (Plender, 
Bernanke). However, this argument does not addresses how the exorbitant privilege translates to 
lower government borrowing costs. 
 
(Bloomberg Terminal, 5/6/20) 
 
30-year yields, which proxy government borrowing costs, seem to support the argument that 
reserve status reduces interest rates. However, other countries pay lower rates on sovereign debt 
than the US does. Moreover, substantial variation within the Eurozone suggests that country-
specific factors are more important.  
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(Bloomberg Terminal, 5/6/20) 
 
There is a substantial cohort of countries that borrow in US dollars instead of their local 
currency. Presumably, they would only do this because they had no choice, as it is far more 
favorable for a nation for its debts to be denominated in its own currency (Dalio). These 
countries pay far higher rates than the US does, but substantial variation within indicates that 
country specifics are far more significant than reserve status. In any case, it seems that sovereign 
yields neither prove nor disprove the exorbitant privilege. Furthermore, rates do not constrain 
debt burdens as long as nominal GDP grows faster than nominal debt service (Dalio 12).  
 
Bernanke does not dispel the notion of exorbitant privilege, but argues that the “benefits of the 
dollar’s status...have been much reduced in recent decades.” The end of Bretton Woods brought 
an era in which currency was “decentralized” and decisions were made “largely by market 
participants” (Bernanke). Bernanke highlights four merits of the dollar: stability of value, 
liquidity, safety, and lender of last resort. Each of these topics is inextricably connected to the 
US dollar privilege and consequent monetary and fiscal freedom. Bernanke also notes that 
creation of dollar denominated assets outside of the US (e.g., dollarized corporate debt or 
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sovereign bonds) makes other nations vulnerable to changes in US monetary policy, which can 
significantly impact global credit cycles by changing interest rates for foreign borrows and 
exchange rates that affect debt serviceability (Bernanke). The creation of foreign dollarized 
assets increases demand for dollars as dollar-denominated debts are paid off, contributing to the 
exorbitant privilege.  
 
Dutch Disease and the Implications of an Exorbitant Privilege: 
If the US does in fact enjoy an exorbitant privilege through the dollar, the dollar is analogous to 
any natural resource. In 1995, Sachs and Warner identified that “economies with a high ratio of 
natural resource exports to GDP in 1971 tended to have low growth rates during the subsequent 
period 1971-89” (Sachs).   
(Figure: Sachs 42) 
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The relationship doesn’t appear particularly robust and is subject to many confounding factors. 
Per Sachs and Warner, “the data are suggestive” but “far from definitive” (Sachs 23). However, 
it raises an interesting notion: perhaps resource endowment predisposes economies to failure.  
 
In 1999, Gylfason et. al. researched the impact of focused on Dutch disease, and found that 
concentration in primary sectors “causes the currency to appreciate in real terms” (Gylfason 
204). The most significant determinants of GDP growth are “initial GDP and the ratio of 
investment to GDP (Gylfason 205). Countries with substantial employment in the primary sector 
(natural resources, agriculture, etc.) had low investment rates, translating to poor growth.  
 
(Figure: Gylfason 205) 
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Resource-rich countries had low levels of investment in “human capital,” which manifested in 
low education levels and consequently low per-capita income levels. Gylfason et. al. suspect that 
this is because primary output “may need—and also generate—less human capital than services 
and manufacturing” (Gylfason 206). Floating exchange rates exacerbate this issue because they 
“provide insurance for the dominating primary export industry at the cost of increased exchange 
rate uncertainty for all other industries” (Gylfason 206). Increased activity in the primary sector 
“causes the currency to appreciate in real terms” and “making it difficult for other potential 
export industries to establish themselves or for existing ones to thrive” (Gylfason 207).  
 
Mehlum’s research confirms the Sachs and Warner argument that “more natural resources push 
aggregate income down” (Mehlum 1). However, he finds that “institutions are decisive for the 
resource curse” a theme Sachs and Warner de-emphasized (Mehlum 1). Whereas Sachs and 
Warner argued that “resource abundance leads to deteriorating institutional quality,” Mehlum 
argues that resource-rich nations can be divided into “producer friendly institutions, where rent-
seeking and production are complementary activities, and grabber friendly institutions, where 




(Figure: Mehlum 2) 
 
Mechanically, this manifests as the “immediate income effect of a higher resource rent” 
increasing national income in the short term, but “the displacement effect reduces national 
income as entrepreneurs move from production to grabbing” (Mehlum 9). However, producer 
friendly institutions “increase profits both in grabbing and production, and thus [lead] to higher 
total income” (Mehlum 9). Under this view, resource richness is a precondition for, but not a 
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determinant of, Dutch disease. If rent-seeking and production are complementary, Dutch disease 
does not manifest.  
 
Not every resource rich country has Dutch disease: “for every Venezuela and Nigeria, there is a 
Norway or a Botswana” (Robinson 451). Thus, the institutional argument seems more 
compelling. Politics provides a lens for understanding institutional failure. Robinson argues that 
“political incentives that resource endowments generate are key to understanding whether or not 
they are a curse” (Robinson Abstract). There are numerous examples of “dysfunctional state 
behavior, particularly large public sectors, and unsustainable budgetary policies” in resource-
advantaged economies (Robinson 448). Leadership adapts to resource abundance with policies 
that depend on continued abundance, rather than metaphorically saving for a rainy day. Leaders 
“discount the future by the probability they remain in power” rather than optimize for long term 
prosperity of a nation. In a survey of resource-rich nations, a World Bank project indicates that 
“spending levels should have been adjusted to sharp rises in income levels more cautiously than 
they actually were,” and that resource-rich nations suffer from a “chronic tendency for the state 
to become overextended” (Robinson 448). Permanent resource booms exaggerate resource 
extraction because they “increase the value of being in power and lead politicians to allocate 
more resources to staying in power” (Robinson 466). The “interaction between institutions and 
resources” determines the extent of the resource curse (Robinson 451). Resources “create 
inefficiency in the rest of the economy because they encourage politicians to engage in 
inefficient redistribution to influence elections” (Robinson 466). However, “resource booms tend 
to raise national income” when institutions “limit the ability of politicians to use clientelism to 
bias elections” (Robinson 466).  
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Robinson’s paper highlights the duality of natural resources: natural resources are incredibly 
useful for a nation and can be used to construct long term prosperity. However, they create 
immense incentives for those in power to consolidate them, creating a concentration of wealth 
that discourages efficient allocation of resources and stifles economic progress. Monopolization 
of resources leaves little for others and inadvertently crushes long term economic growth for the 
sake of short-term personal gain. Power figures nevertheless engage in this activity, driven by a 
short term objective function. The resource curse scenario is unsustainable: the non-resource 
economy is starved as the resource is depleted.   
 
The Dutch Disease Analogy: 
The resource curse is analogous to the situation in which the US finds itself today. The dollar is 
an immense resource: the US has unlimited production capacity, and the real demand for dollars 
is greater than that for any commodity on Earth. Since the end of Bretton Woods, the US has 
enjoyed a resource boom of dollars, which it could produce without the constraint of gold 
convertibility and with the support of international dollar demand as necessary to support 
continued economic growth. The reserve dollar’s benefits accrued to established institutions of 
politicians, corporations, and the finance industry at the expense of real economic growth, 
industry, and average Americans. This growth is unsustainable: it is driven by debt (liabilities) in 





The Symptoms of the Dutch Disease: 
In the past ~60 years, the American economy has become considerably less effective at 
increasing living standards for all people. The United States has seen growing wealth disparity , 
particularly through transfers to the financial sector that coincide with general economic anemia. 
The economy, as an institution, has failed to create prosperity for most Americans.  
 
Real household income and net worth for the bottom 60% of Americans are stagnant. The 
“American Dream” of greater prosperity for subsequent generations is dead in a growth-starved 
economy: 
 










Employment in manufacturing, a critical source of high-paying jobs for the working class, has 
declined considerably: 
(Figure: Dalio 3) 
 
Income growth by employment industry also illustrate this trend. The financial economy has 
seen the greatest gains, along with computation, healthcare, science, and engineering. These are 
all high skill fields that are challenging to outsource. Meanwhile, low-skill fields and those that 
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can be outsourced are stagnating or declining. The decline in Education, which is responsible for 
long term productivity and economic growth, reflects institutional failure:  
(Figure: Dalio 10) 
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These changes indicate that the economic structure of the US is changing. These changes are 
materially impacting substantial portions of the population, with profound social effects that are 
polarizing society and its politics.    
(Figure: Dalio 5) 
(Figure: Dalio) 
 
An increasingly disparate economy shifts incremental wealth from the working class to the 
professional and financial classes. There are many causes: globalization, automation/technology, 
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and financialization. However, the economy as an institution has failed if its purpose is to bring 
prosperity to all. Leaving this statement without justification: an economy in which the vast 
majority of growth accrues to a small portion of the population is not sustainable. Eventually, the 
disparity will lead to political issues, and arguably already has. American confidence in public 
institutions has declined immensely:   
 
(Figure: Dalio 7) 
 
Financialization in the US:  
Part of America’s economic polarization can be traced to financialization, a process in which 
“profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity 
production” (Krippner 103). These profits “do not show up in transparent ways in national 
economic statistics (Block, 1987)” (Krippner 175). This part of the economy is called FIRE: 
“finance, insurance and real estate.” (Krippner 179). FIRE has grown substantially as a portion 
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of US GDP since 1950. (Note: this analysis is merely relative shares of GDP among services, 
manufacturing, and FIRE) 
(Figure: Krippner 178) 
Though FIRE comprises an increasingly large portion of GDP, it employs relatively few people: 
 
(Figure: Krippner 178) 
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However, FIRE generates an increasingly disproportionate amount of profits: 












Financialization is happening throughout the economy. Portfolio income, or the income 
companies derive from financial assets, increasingly dominates total cash flow for all 
nonfinancial firms: 
(Figure: Krippner 186) 
 
Portfolio income can be segmented into dividends, capital gains, and interest. A declining 
portion of dividends indicates that increasing cash flow is not a product of ownership transfer to 




(Figure: Krippner 187) 
 Krippner’s data indicates that all companies, financial and nonfinancial, have reallocated capital 
toward financial ends. American companies have seen a contemporaneous relationship in the 
relationship between capital and labor: wages stagnate despite increasing productivity, with the 















The changes above are explained as a response to “international competition and domestic 
demands for shareholder return” (Zwan 103). In response to international competition, American 
corporations have “off-shored production and controlled foreign supply chains to cut back on 
costs” (Zwan 104). To meet shareholder return demands, “productivity gains” were not 
“reinvested in the corporation, but rather...distributed to shareholders or used for the purchase of 
financial products (Crotty, 2005; Milberg, 2008; Baud and Durand, 2012)” (Zwan 104).  
 
The shift to “financial products” reflects a turn from productive activity and capital investment to 
financial engineering. The emergence of financial products benefitted financial institutions, per 
Krippner’s data. However, these changes extend beyond the financial sector: “profits from 
interest, dividends, and capital gains for non-financial corporations have outpaced those from 
productive investment” (Zwan 103). And as shown by Dalio’s broader economic data, the 
“victory of the rentiers has come at the expense of wage-earners and households, who have faced 
stagnating real wages and increased indebtedness” (Zwan 105). 
 
The Ideological Impetus of Financialization: 
Financialization reflects changing corporate priorities. In 1970, Milton Friedman famously 
proclaimed in the New York Times that the “social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profits” (Friedman). He argued that company management was acting as “a principal, not an 
agent” by incorporating the “social responsibilities of individuals” into business objectives 
(Friedman). Instead, the “great virtue of private competitive enterprise” was in “[forcing] people 
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to be responsible for their own actions and [making] it difficult for them to ‘exploit’ other people 
for selfish or unselfish purposes” (Friedman).  
 
This theory was immensely influential, and variations of this thinking made their way into C-
suites throughout America. The increased prevalence of financial nomenclature “bottom line” 
and “equity” indicate this shift in zeitgeist in the early 1970s, in which profit and shareholder 
returns increasingly became the focus of the American corporation: 
 
(Figure: Google nGram Viewer, Prevalence in All English Text) 
 
(Figure: Google nGram Viewer, Prevalence in All English Text) 
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Policy Changes that Enabled Financialization: 
Monetary policy based on asset prices rather than employment conditions for average Americans 
“increased financial fragility in combination with declining wages” and “created a growth regime 
that relies on debt-driven consumption and housing bubbles” that “undermin[es] its own liquidity 
and solvency’ (Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 138)” (Zwan 105). In an economy built on consumption and 
debt rather than production, the Federal Reserve must manipulate asset prices to prevent 
recession. The financial economy trumps the real economy as the credit cycle subverts the 
business cycle. In a rising credit cycle, “asset price inflation that raises collateral values, which 
allows more borrowing that finances investment spending and drives economic expansion” 
(Palley 16). In a falling credit cycle, “balance sheets become congested so that borrowing and 
investment fall, setting off a downturn in which asset prices fall. Credit constraints then tighten, 
causing a cumulative spiral downward (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997)” (Palley 16). The new 
importance of financial assets to the economy prompted the Federal Reserve’s “abandonment of 
full employment,” which “refers to changed priorities regarding macroeconomic policy, which 
elevated the significance of low inflation and reduced the significance of full employment 
(Palley 24).   
 
Central banks’ shifting priorities are  “implemented through policies of inflation targeting and 
central bank independence, both of which are supported by financial interests (Epstein 2001; 
Palley 1996b)” (Palley 24). Unlike “pre-1980 policy” that “tacitly focused on putting a floor 
under labor markets to preserve employment and wages,” modern monetary policy “policy 
tacitly puts a floor under asset prices” (Palley 25). The “macro economy” is “vulnerable to asset 
price declines” and the Federal Reserve “is obliged to step in to prevent such declines from 
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inflicting broad macroeconomic damage” (Palley 25). With each cycle, this arrangement “has the 
twin consequence of bailing out investors and also potentially creating investor moral hazard” 
(Palley 25).  
 
The Federal Reserve’s support of asset prices exacerbates wealth inequality because asset 
ownership is highly skewed to high net worth individuals. Moreover, the growth of debt 
supporting the credit cycle “transfers income from high marginal propensity to spend debtors to 
lower marginal propensity to spend creditors, and this process of transfer can generate business 
cycles.” (Palley 17) This process is distinct from the “pre-financialized” US, in which “wage 
growth, rather than borrowing, fueled consumption and demand growth...that then encouraged 
investment spending, which in turn drove productivity and output growth.” (Palley 25) 
 
Regulatory changes including the “introduction of financial performance measures such as return 
on equity, the adoption of international accounting standards, and...the publication of quarterly 
reports (Ju ̈rgens et al.,2000; Bo ̈rsch, 2004; Widmer, 2011)” contribute to the short-term value-
extractive orientation of markets (Zwan 108). 
 
Financialization in the post-Bretton Woods Era: 
The “collapse of the Bretton Woods regime” and the “booming Eurodollar markets of the post-
war period” enabled the “globalization of American finance (Konings, 2008)” (Zwan 105). 
Dollar strength supported by foreign demand for assets suppressed domestic industry. The loss of 
manufacturing activity to abroad substantially advanced financialization. Stein argues that “the 
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Carter Administration ultimately reinforced the movement of capital away from the real 
economy and thus solidified the deindustrialization of the American economy.” (Zwan 106) 
 
In subsequent years, the US “took the path to financialization” characterized by “progressive 
taxation and loose credit in hopes of keeping deflation at bay and consumption in line with 
productive output” (Zwan 117). This places the roots of financialization before the 1970s, and 
stands in contrast to the approaches of European powers, where “wages were purposively kept 
low in order to curtail consumption and rebuild the productive capacities of their economies” 
(Zwan 117).  
 
Effective “bailouts” of asset markets and interest rate suppression, consistent with the Federal 
Reserve’s reorientation to asset markets, created a debt boom in the United States. Both financial 
and nonfinancial corporations have drastically increased their borrowings. Kripper’s capital 
allocation data suggests a substantial fraction of incremental corporate debt is being used for 
financial engineering purposes.  
 




Financialization and Corporate Activity: 
Financialization has led to a dearth of real corporate investment in productive capacity, creating 
an effective deindustrialization. Unlike the “industrial-age” corporation, the “financialized 
corporation” does not reinvest “financial gains from these operations in the firm’s productive 
facilities, but rather are distribute[s] [them] to shareholders through dividend payouts and share 
buybacks”(Zwan 108). 
 
Friedman-style shareholder return attitudes became more common in corporations. Performance-
based compensation, designed to align management and shareholders created a “perversion of 
shareholder value” in which “top-level managers” enjoy “unprecedented degrees of wealth” due 
to the “shift away from salaries to stock options” whose allocation is determined by “stock price” 
and other “arbitrary targets” (Zwan 108). The shift in compensation created conditions under 
which “CEOs of the largest corporations” earn “several hundred times higher incomes than the 
average worker (DiPrete et al., 2004; Englander and Kaufman, 2004; Bebchuk and Grinstein, 
2005)” (Zwan 108).  
Mishel at al. (2007) report that CEO pay has exploded from thirty-eight times average 
worker pay in 1979 to two hundred and sixty-two times worker pay in 2005. Bebchuck 
and Grinstein (2005) report that pay for the top five officers of S&P 500 companies rose 





(Figure: Palley 19) 
“This new pattern suggests changed purpose of corporate borrowing. Before 1980 it 
financed investment spending, but since 1980 a significant portion of borrowing appears 
to be for purposes of equity buy-backs.” (Palley 20) 
 
These “new patterns” show that “financial markets tend to prefer that corporations use debt to 
finance their activities owing to its tax advantages and the higher rates of return on equity that 
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leverage allows” (Palley 21). These activities effectively and surreptitiously extract of value 
from the real economy and into the financial economy. Specifically: 
Rather than paying dividends that are highly taxed, markets prefer corporations to use 
profits to repurchase stock, which drives up the stock price and generates lower-taxed 
capital gains. Finally, increased debt issuance transforms profit streams into interest 
payment streams, which reduces corporate income available for other non-financial 
claimants. (Palley 21) 
 
The activities of management teams to enrich themselves and placate shareholders can be seen in 
their capital allocation. Large negative net equity issuance indicates stock buybacks, much of 
which were financed with cheap debt, in an effort to drive stock prices and other management 
targets, such as return on equity, which is enhanced by reducing shares outstanding.  
 
Shareholder value orientation has similarly punishing effects on workers. Restructuring is 
“associated with job loss and other cutbacks (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000),” and remaining 
workers work “longer hours for lower pay and fewer benefits” (Zwan 109).  More broadly, 
responsibility has shifted from corporations to individuals with “discourses of risk-taking, self-
management, and self-fulfillment” (Zwan 112). Instead of “postwar welfare schemes” and 
generous corporate benefits/pensions, individuals “encounter a world of risk, in which they 
themselves are responsible for dealing with the uncertainties of life Cutler and Waine, 2001)” 
(Zwan 112).  
 
Financialization discourse impacts labor and capital asymmetrically by creating the “‘investing 
subject’ (Aitken, 2007, p. 13),” an individual who “acts on his own for the benefit of himself” 
and must “insure himself against the risks of the life cycle through financial literacy and self-
discipline” (Zwan 113). The financialized subject must “pil[e] on debt despite stagnating wages” 
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and will “suffer the most from the periodic crises that financialized capitalism creates, as their 
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